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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER JO&\SOi\, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RAMONA MERRITT JOHL\SOI\ , 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14647 
B R I E F O F R E S P O ^ D E w T 
STATEMENT OF THE MATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the appellant against the 
respondent on an Order to Show Cause. 
DISPOSITION Ii* LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, denied appellant's 
claim for relief and dismissed the Order to Show Cause. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have the order denying tne 
defendant's claim for relief on tne Order to Show Cause affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The plaintiff-husband and defendant-wife, were 
married in Missoula, Montana, on August 19, 1948. 
2. On November 15, 1974, the plaintiff-husband filed a 
Complaint in the District Court, County of Davis, State of Utah, 
seeking a Decree of Divorce (R-l through 3). 
3. On December 16, 1974, an Amended Complaint was filed 
by the plaintiff-husband. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. Pursuant to the Amended Complaint, the Second 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, Judge, 
issued an Order to Show Cause, returnable December 31, 1974. I 
5. The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim 
in the District Court of Davis County, State of Utah on December 30, 
1974, wherein she listed her income, liabilities, and expenses 
(R-10 through 14). 
6. At the request of counsel for the defendant, the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, continued the Order to Show 
Cause to January 30, 1975 (R-15). j 
7. On February 3, 1975, the defendant filed an Order 
to Show Cause seeking temporary child support and temporary 
alimony until the divorce matter could be heard on its merits. 
The Order to Show Cause was signed by the Honorable Thornley K. 
Swan, Judge. 
8. The Order to Show Cause which had been signed by 
the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, Judge, came before the Second 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, 
presiding, on February 6, 1975. At that time, Judge Hyde ordered 
the defendant to tear up the Power of Attorney, which the wife 
had had for many years, and required the plaintiff to make the 
house payment and utilities on a temporary basis. Furthermore, 
Judge Hyde noted that the plaintiff had agreed to pay $200.00 per 
month support plus the outstanding obligations of the parties herein. 
9. The order on the Order to Show Cause, referred to 
above, was signed by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, on February 20, 
1975. 
10. On March 25, 1975, the defendant filed a motion Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to Compel Discovery in the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District (R-29). 
11. The defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery came 
before the District Court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, 
Judge, presiding on April 1, 1975. The Court ordered copies of 
the document to be given defendant's attorney (R-31). 
12. A pre-trial order was issued by the Honorable 
Thomley K. Swan, Judge, setting the case for a non-jury trial 
on the 16th day of May, 1975 (R-51). 
13. A dispute arose between the parties pertaining to 
the temporary order issued by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on 
February 6, over the amount that the plaintiff was to pay towards 
the utilities used by the defendant (R-55). 
14. On May 23, 1975, the Honorable Thomley K. Swan 
issued the Order to Show Cause in re contempt wherein the 
plaintiff was ordered to appear before the Second Judicial District, 
in and for Davis County, on the 3rd day of June, 1975. 
15. On June 3, 1975, upon stipulation of counsel for 
the parties, the Order to Show Cause was continued by the Honorable 
Thomley K. Swan, Judge, to June 10, 1975. 
16. On June 10, 1975, the matter came before the 
District Court of the Second Judicial District, County of Davis, 
for the hearing on the Order to Show Cause. The Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist, interpreting Judge Hyde's Order on the Order 
to Show Cause, ordered that the plaintiff was required to pay 
only $35.00 per month on the utilities until further ordered 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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by the court (R-60). 
17. On June 17, 1975, the defendant filed an affidavit 
seeking $256.14 for alleged deficiencies in plaintiff's payments 
to her pursuant to the February 6, 1975, temporary order. 
18. On June 18, 1975, the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, presiding, 
issued the Order to Show Cause to the plaintiff ordering him to 
show cause on the 27th day of June, 1975, at the commencement 
of trial, why he should not be required to pay to the defendant 
the sum of $256.14. 
19. Trial in the divorce proceeding was held on June 27, 
1975, in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, presiding. In the affidavit 
of income, assets, and liabilities, dated June 27, 1975, the 
defendant included, for the first time, liabilities of $275.00 
to Dr. Steven Morgan, dentist; and $250.00 to Franca Dunham. 
These liabilities had not been listed in the schedule filed 
December 30, 1974 (R-14). 
20. A memorandum decision was issued by the Second 
Judicial District Court, County of Davis, the Honorable Ronald 0. 
Hyde, Judge, presiding, on June 30, 1975. The Court granted the 
defendant a divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty on her 
counterclaim. The care, custody and control of the minor child 
was granted to the defendant subject to reasonable rights of 
visitation in plaintiff. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the 
sum of $100.00 per month for tne support of the minor child until 
he reached the age of majority. The plaintiff was further Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ordered to pay the sum of $200.00 per month alimony to the 
defendant. The defendant was awarded the house and real 
property in Layton, subject to the mortgage thereon, together 
with the household furniture and fixtures therein. The plaintiff 
was awarded the mobile home in Kaysville, subject to the mortgage 
thereon. The plaintiff was also awarded a Vista Liner Camper 
and pickup truck, a 1969 Ford Galaxie, which was inoperable, 
and a 1967 Mustang, which also Was inoperable. The defendant 
was awarded a 1960 Opal. The contract interest which the parties 
had in property located in Kaysville was awarded to the defendant. 
The plaintiff was awarded the New York Life Insurance policy, his 
own county insurance and retirement, whatever savings he had in 
the Credit Union, his fishing gear, antique barbed wire collec-
tion, and his tools. The defendant was awarded stock which had 
a purchase value of $100.00. The plaintiff was ordered to pay 
all of the outstanding obligations of the parties excepting the 
mortgage on the house awarded to the defendant. The utility 
bills that had been in dispute since the hearing on the Order to 
Show Cause were to be paid by the plaintiff. Judge Hyde also 
awarded $400.00 in attorney's fees to the defendant and ordered 
defendant's attorney to draw Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree in accordance with the memorandum. 
21. On July 11, 1975, attorney for plaintiff wrote 
Judge Hyde pointing out that the award of the attorney's fees 
appeared to have been made in error since no testimony was presented 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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nor request was made for attorney's fees. Further, Mrs. 
Johnson had insurance to cover her attorney's fees and her attor-
ney, Mr. Barnes, had, in fact, received $325.00 from the insurance 
company for the initial filing of the action. Judge Hyde res-
ponded on July 17, 1975, amending the Decree to delete the award 
of the attorney's fees. 
22. On January 27, 1976, the defendant filed an 
Affidavit for an Order to Show Cause in re contempt in which she 
alleged that the plaintiff had failed to pay certain outstanding 
debts. The Honorable John H. Wahlquist, Judge, ordered the 
plaintiff to appear before the District Court of Davis County on 
March 4, 1976, to show cause why he should not be judged guilty 
of contempt of court and punished accordingly for willfully 
disobeying the Order made on the 12th day of September, 1975. 
23. The plaintiff filed an Affidavit in answer to 
the Order to Show Cause on February 24, 1976. In the Affidavit, 
the plaintiff swore upon his oath that he had paid the property 
tax on the family home for the year 1974; that he had paid the 
utility debts alleged to be unpaid in the Order to Show Cause; 
that he would, in fact, pay all outstanding obligations incurred 
prior to the filing of the Complaint in the divorce action; 
that he had, in good faith, paid all of the obligations and bills 
which had been incurred prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
Further, the plaintiff stated under oath that when he went to 
pick up the camper and truck, which had been granted him in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the Decree of Divorce, sugar had been dumped in the gas tank 
of the truck and the gas and water lines had been ripped from 
the camper. Further, the plaintiff asserted that the burden of 
alimony posed an undue hardship on him, that his wife was a fit 
and proper person to work, and that a limit on alimony should 
be imposed in this case so that he could get remarried and enjoy 
a fruitful life. 
24. The defendant's Order to Show Cause came before 
the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and 
for the County of Davis, State of Utah, on March 18, 1976. At 
that time, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, was presiding. The 
defendant, plaintiff, Lynn Madsen, Clinton Hansen, and David Ray 
Johnson, were sworn and testified. The Court denied the request 
of the plaintiff for a reduction in alimony, and took the re-
maining matters under advisement. 
25. On March 19, 1976, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, 
issued a memorandum decision wherein he stated, referring to the 
defendant's claims of debt: 
ffI find the defendant's credibility to be seriously 
questioned and I elect not to believe her testimony. 
The other aspect of tne case is that she further 
tests my credibility to ask me to believe that she 
has no knowledge nor hand in the events in the 
damage to the truck and camper.. The whole picture 
is one of post-divorce efforts to harrass the 
plaintiff-husband on every item that can be 
conceived by the defendant. The circumstances 
surrounding the truck and camper compel me to 
deny any relief to the defendant based on equitable 
clean hands doctrine. The Order to Show Cause is to 
be dismissed (R-95)." 
26. From that ruling, the defendant appealed. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
PQIi*T I 
JUDGE GOULD WAS r*OT ACTING AS Ax\ APPELLATE JUDGE 
WHEi* HE PRESIDED AT THE HEARING Oft DEFENDANT'S 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE Ax\D DECLARATION I* RE CONTEMPT 
The District Court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, except those specifically excepted 
in the Utah Constitution or prohibited by law. The District Court, 
or any judges thereof, shall have power to issue the writs necessary 
to carry into effect their orders, judgments and decrees, Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 8, UCA 78-3-4. Proceedings in 
divorce are to be commended and conducted in the manner provided 
by law for proceedings in civil cases. UCA 30-3-1. Pursuant 
to the above mentioned statutory provisions, a complaint seeking 
divorce was filed by the plaintiff on November 15, 1974, U* the 
Second Judicial District Court, County of Davis, State of Utah. 
During the course of the proceedings, as set forth in the state-
ment of facts, many of the justices of the Second Judicial District 
Court, were called upon to hear Orders to Show Cause and to make 
preliminary rulings. Justices Swan, Hyde, Wahlquist, and Gould 
participated in the proceedings prior to the divorce decree 
being issued. Despite the participation of the justices, 
however, the cause of action was always proceeding in the Second 
Judicial District Court. Rule 40 (a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, explains the procedure for placing cause of action 
upon the trial calendar. It states: 
-8-
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"The District Court shall provide by rule for the 
placing of the actions upon the trial calendar 
(1) without request of the parties or (2) upon 
request of a party and notice to the other parties 
or (3) in such other manner as the Court may 
deem expediant. Precedents shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute." 
Rule 6, Court Rules of tne Second District Court states: 
"A. The court administrator shall make assignments 
of cases and motions and recommend judge assignments 
to provide, as far as practical, that: (l) responsibility 
shall be equally borne by all individual judges, 
reporters, and clerks; (2) all types of litigation 
shall be handled in substantially equal proportions 
by individual judges, reporters and clerks, except 
special probate clerks. (3) In the court administrator's 
discretion, the health and well being of the individual 
judge, reporter, and other court personnel is 
promoted; but all requests for special scheduling 
or changes in assignments for personal reasons, 
health, or otherwise, shall be made known to the 
judges at the next general meeting. 
B. The court administrator may request the reassignment 
of a judge, reporter, or clerk at any time if the object 
of the change is to effect any of the above goals. 
Pursuant to the above mentioned statutory provisions, the various 
motions of the divorce proceeding were placed upon the Law and 
Motion Calendar. The motions were then heard and determined by 
the justices presiding on that date. No objection was raised 
concerning the jurisdiction of the court nor was objections raised 
as to the power of the justices to hear the motion. The defendant, 
appellant herein, does not question the validity of the orders 
issued preliminarily, but seeks to attack the post judgment 
ruling by Judge Gould. The basic theory upon which such an attack 
is predicated appears to be that the Second Judicial District 
Court, Judge Gould presiding, by failing to find the plaintiff 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in contempt was, in effect, not "enforcing" the Decree issued 
by the Second Judicial District, Judge Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding. 
This position is clearly untenable. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 30-3-5 states: 
"When a Decree of Divorce is made, the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property, 
and parties, and the maintenance of the parties and 
children as may be equitable. The Court snail have 
continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes 
or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance 
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable 
and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grand-
parents and other relatives shall take into considera-
tion the welfare of the child." 
The Court, not the individual judge presiding in a particular 
divorce case, has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance 
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and 
necessary. Pursuant to the statutory provisions of U.C.A. 30-3-5, 
the defendant filed the order to show cause and declaration 
in re contempt. The cause of action was placed on the Law and 
Motion Calendar and assigned to the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge. 
The Utah Supreme Court in In re Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 
(Utah 1975), a case cited with approval by appellant, recognized 
that when a motion is placed on the Law and Motion Calendar, any 
judge of the court handling the calendar has jurisdiction to act 
upon the motion. In Mecham, the heirs of the estate filed a 
petition for an Order to Show Cause why the administrator snould 
not file his accounting. After various hearing and proceedings, 
the administrator filed such an accounting and petition for dis-
tribution and discharge. It was noticed for hearing before Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Judge Joseph G. Jeppson. Judge Jeppson ordered that the final 
account be denied but allowed the petitioner to amend. A month 
later the administrator filed a supplement to his accounting and 
mailed a copy to the counsel for the objecting heirs. Later, the 
administrator went to Judge Jeppson and obtained an ex parte 
order approving the account and granting the petition for a 
distribution and discharge. The objecting heirs filed a timely 
objection attacking the accounting and requested that the matter 
be set for trial. Subsequently, the administrator served and 
filed a motion to strike tiie objections and inserted a notice 
that the matter would be heard witnin the next few days. Counsel 
for the objecting heirs asserted that he was unaware of tne hearing 
and consequently was not present at the hearing. He filed a motion 
to vacate xhe order. Altnough the motion would ordinarily have 
been presented to Judge Jeppson, Judge Jeppson told the counsel 
for the objecting heirs that tne motion should be placed on the 
Law and Motion calendar. Tne Utah Supreme Court, reviewing the 
above mentioned situation, stated: 
"Under such circumstances there is no question but that 
any other judge of the court handling the Law and Motion 
calendar, including Judge Taylor, would have nad 
jurisdiction to act upon the motion, nor that any 
action taken thereon if deemed proper, would be 
subject to attack to have it corrected by a proper 
motion, and/or by an appeal. 537 P.2d 312-313. 
The Utah Supreme Court went on to hold that Judge Stewart Hansen's 
ruling dismissing the order of Judge Taylor, because Judge Hansen 
believed that it purported to overrule the previous order of Judge 
Jeppson, was in error. The Court said: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"We have no doubt about the rule, applicable under 
proper circumstances, that a judge of one division 
of the same court cannot act as an appellate court 
and overrule another such judge, but that rule does 
not apply to the order of Judge Taylor in this case." 
As delineated above, the objectors timely and properly invoked 
the jurisdiction of the court in filing their motion against the 
ex parte order of October 19, 1972, approving the accounting. 
While in normal procedure and protocol, this motion would have 
come up before Judge Jeppson, when he directed that it be placed 
on the general Law and Motion Calendar, any judge of the court 
had jurisdiction to act in the matter. When Judge Taylor did 
so, and his order was not changed or appealed from, it became 
the effective order in the case. 537 P.2d 312, 314. 
In the case at bar, a similar fact situation is present. 
Judge Hyde issued the original divorce decree. When the defendant 
invoked the jurisdiction of the court in her Order to Show Cause 
and Declaration in re contempt, the motion was placed on the 
general Law and Motions Calendar. Pursuant to the language of 
the Mecham case, any judge of tne court, including Judge Gould, 
handling the Law and Motion Calendar, would have had jurisdiction 
to act upon the motion. Exercising such jurisdiction was a proper 
exercise of the power and authority vested in Judge Gould by 
virtue of his position as a District Court Judge in the Second 
Judicial District Court. 
As mentioned above, U.C.A. Sec. 30-3-5 provides: 
"When a Decree of Divorce is made, the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property, 
and parties, and the maintenance of the parties 
and children as may be equitable. The court 
shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of the children and their support and maintenance, 
or the distribution of the property as shall be 
reasonable and necessary. Parents, grandparents 
and other relations shall take into consideration 
the welfare 01 the child. (Emphasis added). 
Although the court retains continuous jurisdiction over the 
matter, the action in re contempt is separate and apart from the 
principal action. Robinson v. City Court for City of Ogden, 
112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 (1949); Bott v. Bott, 20 U.2d 329, 437 
P.2d 684 (1968). When an action in re contempt is instituted in 
civil contempt proceedings dealing with failure of a divorced 
spouse to honor the divorce decree, the jurisdiction of tne 
original divorce action over tne parties and issues is relied 
upon* However, the contempt action is placed on the general Law 
and Motion calendar. In Holbrook v. Holbrook, 117 Utah 114, 
208 P.2d 1113, (1949) a divorce was granted to the wife on May 3, 
1948, by the Second Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley, presiding. In a subsequent contempt hearing 
the Honorable A. H. Ellett, temporarily sitting in the Second 
Judicial District, presided. Although Judge Cowley had issued 
tne original divorce decree, tne Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
contempt decree conviction issued by Judge Ellett. 
The necessity of allowing a second judge to preside over 
contempt nearings is based upon strong public policy. Often 
times a contempt proceeding for alleged failure to abide by a 
divorce decree may be instituted several years after the 
original divorce decree. In Andersen v. Baker, 5 U.2d 33, 296 
O O J O O ^ / T i ^ ' - ^ ^ J.i . . . . 
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after the divorce, the husband was found in contempt of the 
1949 divorce decree. In dicta, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"The fact that the court below had jurisdiction over 
the parties and jurisdiction to interpret the 
stipulation and original decree must be recognized. 
Any error that may be present does not concern 
lack of jurisdiction. 296 P.2d 283, 285. 
In Petersen v. Petersen, 530 P2d 821 (Utah, 1974), the parties 
obtained a Decree of Divorce in May, 1955. In August, 1965, 
an Order to Show Cause was issued against the wife alleging 
failure to comply with the visitation rights of the 1955 Decree. 
The Honorable Merrill C. Faux executed an order holding Mrs. 
Petersen in contempt and suspended the payment of support money 
until such time as Mrs. Petersen appeared before the Court in 
person and purged herself of contempt. Nine and a half years 
later, Mrs. Petersen moved for an Order to Show Cause why Mr. 
Petersen should not have to pay an amount equal to the suspended 
support payments. Third District Court Judge Peter Leary, held 
that Judge Faux's August, 1965 contempt order was vacated. The 
Utan Supreme Court, however, held that Judge Leary!s ruling 
which vacated the 1965 contempt order was in error and sustained 
Faux's order. Again, this fact situation is very similar to the 
case at bar, although Judge Hyde presided at the divorce trial, 
Judge Gould presided at the contempt hearing. As in the case of 
Judge Faux^ Judge Gould had the necessary statutory power and 
authority to preside at that hearing. When he made nis decision, 
that decision was not capable of review by another judge in the 
-14-
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District Court. Judge Gould was not reviewing nor modifying the 
Divorce Decree issued by Judge Hyde, but rather was presiding 
in an independent action to determine whether the plaintiff was 
to be found in contempt. 
In the case at bar, Judge Gould was not acting as an 
appellate judge. The contempt proceedings was a separate action 
from the divorce action. Although the actions were related, 
having the same parties and concerning some of the same properties, 
the actions were independent. When the defendant filed the Order 
to Show Cause and declaration in re contempt, it was placed 
on the general Law and Motion Calendar. Judge Gould, assigned 
to sit at the Law and Motion hearings, properly heard the motion 
and evidence thereto. No objection was made by the defendant 
until after Judge Gould had ruled adversely to her. The grounds 
for which she argues for objecting to his presiding are clearly 
untenable. The Utah Supreme Court has long held that a contempt 
proceeding need not be presided over by the Judge who issued the 
original divorce decree. 
POINT II 
JUDGE GOULD PROPERLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
i\OT Ii\ CONTEMPT OF COURT BASED 0i\ THE EQUITABLE 
CLEAi\ HA^DS DOCTRINE. 
Judge Gould, i** the Order on the Order to Show Cause ruled 
that: 
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the 
defendant's credibility is seriously questioned by 
the Court, and the Court did not elect to believe the 
defendant's testimony as to her knowledge of any 
alleged damage to the truck and trailer, and that 
the wnole picture is one of post divorce efforts 
to harass the plaintiff husband on every item 
that can be conceived of by the defendant, and 
it is further ordered* adiude^ ri a^ H HDP^A/I +V^+ 
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based on the equitable clean hands doctrine. The 
Order to Show Cause is hereby dismissed. (R-95, 96) 
The "clean hands" doctrine has long been recognized in Utah law. 
In Baker v. Baker, 224 P.2d 192 (1950), the court discussed this 
doctrine. It said: 
"It is a general rule that a party that is in contempt 
will not be heard by the court wnen he wishes to make 
a motion or grant a favor, and if a party files a 
pleading w^ile in contempt, it will be stricken from 
the file on motion (citations omitted). In Cole v. 
Cole, 142 111. 19, 31 N.E. 109, 111, 19 L.R.A. 811, 
where a former husbaud was in arrears in his payments 
for alimony petitioned the court for modification of 
the decree in order to have the alimony payments 
reduced, the court denied his petition saying, "He 
is not coming to the court with clean hands and will 
not be permitted to ask relief from a decree from which 
he is in contempt. Before he should be permitted to 
be heard, he should be required to comply witn the 
order of the court up to the time of his application." 
224 P.2d 192, 194. 
In Petersen v. Petersen supra, the Utah Supreme Court also discussed 
the "clean hands" doctrine. The Court said: 
"There is no question that Mrs. Petersen was in contempt 
of court, after having been in such straits for 9 1/2 
years when she applied for the support money judgment 
without having purged herself of the contempt. That 
requirement was a condition precedent to outaining the 
support money, ie, the exercise of Mr. Petersen's right 
to see his children. Mrs. Petersen had not permitted 
this, which became the basis of her contempt. In short, 
she had not done and is not doing equity the while 
she insists on it, by now seeking, without any displayed 
penitence, remorse or strings attached, invoked the 
very jurisdiction of the court that she flouted before. 
She was in no conscionable position to do so, and tne 
court need not have entertained her petition. To coin 
a paraphrased maxim of equity and reduce it to Pidgeon 
English, "One may not make a monkey out of the court", 
without cause, that is. 530 P.2d 821, 822. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff went to get the truck and camper 
which had been awarded him pursuant to the original divorce 
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decree. When he arrived, he found that sugar had been dumped 
in the gas tank, and that other damage had been done to the 
truck and camper. Judge Gould, after a review of tne evidence, 
and testimony given by the parties and other persons concluded 
that he chose not to believe the defendant's testimony that she 
had no knowledge to the alleged damage to the truck and camper. 
Judge Gould found that "The whole picture is one of post divorce 
efforts to harass the plaintiff on every item that can be 
conceived of by the defendant.11 The defendant came into the 
court with "unclean hands". In such straits, she was not in 
a position to ask the court to do equity while she had not done 
equity. It was well within Judge Gould's discretion to refuse to 
require the plaintiff to pay the disputed debts. 
CONCLUSION 
The decree issued by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, 
Judge, granting a divorce to the defendant on her counterclaim, 
and awarding certain property to the parties, as well as care, 
custody, and control of tne minor child, is to be given its full 
force and effect. When the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, pre-
sided in the Order to Show Cause and declaration in re contempt 
hearing, he was not acting as an appellate judge to review or 
modify the divorce issued by Judge Hyde. He was presiding over 
the motion which had been delegated to him by way of the general 
law and motion calendar. After a review of tne evidence and 
testimony of the parties and others, he correctly held that the 
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plaintiff was not in contempt of the court and, because of the 
damage to the truck and camper, would not require the plaintiff 
to pay the disputed claims. These rulings were certainly within 
the power, authority and discretion or the Honorable Calvin 
Gould, Judge. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEVEN C. VAl\DERLIi*DE*\ 
137 East State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Attorney for Respondent 
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